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Jurisprudence: a system or body of
law; the philosophy of law
Juriscience: a system in which
judicial decisions are based on
scientific fact
I. INTRODUCTION
For better or for worse, we are tending to scientize the law. In
those instances when science and law interact, juriscience might
displace jurisprudence. Before that happens, society should evalu-
ate the costs and benefits of such a development. Whether the de-
velopment should be halted is problematic, but it should not occur
sub rosa. Although this Article cannot explore every aspect of the
displacement of jurisprudence by juriscience, it can raise the issue
and add to the concerns already advanced by others. Commenta-
tors have recognized that science itself is harmless, but that the
application of science-technology-is not.1
This Article will examine the effect of the application of science
to the law and the judicial process. Concluding that the threat
posed by science should not be ignored, the Article proposes rules
of technological adjudication which, if adopted, might prevent the
displacement of our jurisprudence.
II. THE TENSION BETWEEN SCIENCE AND LAW
The displacement of jurisprudence by juriscience is not a recent
development, but it is occurring at an accelerating pace and may
be irreversible. No court, however, should base a decision solely on
science if doing so would exclude the transcendental ethical values
of the law. If a court accepts technological activity without evaluat-
* Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. J.D. 1949, Loyola
University of Chicago; M.P.L. 1950, John Marshall Law School.
1. Each reference in this Article to "science" includes the inexact sciences, as well as the
exact sciences and technology.
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ing fairness and justice to the litigants, juriscience has displaced
the jurisprudence that should have governed the case.
The growing list of suggestions to train judges as scientists and
technologists, bureaucratize the courts with staffs comprised of so-
cial and technical scientists, and make other changes to facilitate
the judicial search for scientific truth accelerate this process.2 In-
deed, the suggestions reflect a view that the only real problem in
cases involving scientific issues of fact is that the results may be
unsatisfactory to scientists. If followed, the suggestions would en-
sure a wholesale displacement of our jurisprudence by juriscience.
If the development of science is viewed as a race for dominance
between science and law, science appears to be winning. We per-
ceive the infallible, objective, dedicated nature of the scientific
method as the solution to all of man's problems-capable of elimi-
nating poverty, disease, crime, and the need for labor. But much
would be lost if juriscience were to displace our jurisprudence com-
pletely. Cold, hard facts would govern our society. Values recog-
nized for centuries, such as mercy, compassion, freedom, and jus-
tice-the ethical, moral, and religious considerations that define
our jurisprudence-would be ignored. If these values are to disap-
pear from our society, its law, and its judicial process, their demise
should not go unnoticed or unmourned.
The advance into the courts of the technological explosion that
has permeated business, government, and education is not surpris-
ing. The invasion of science into other areas may raise legitimate
problems, but when it enters the courts, science runs into an intri-
cate system of values. To science, although certainly not to scien-
tists, values are nonexistent. Values, however, are the very life of
the law. Law is not a science, and the judicial process cannot re-
main judicial if subsumed by the value-free scientific process.
Science and law, however, need not be mutually exclusive. Both
should serve society. They should complement each other, rather
than conflict. The problem, however, is that science and law are
inherently and irreconcilably different. Their purposes and meth-
ods are precise opposites. Both science and law seek truth, but
2. See Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA.
L. REv. 509 (1974); Nyhart & Jones, What You Don't Know about Technology Can Hurt
You, 69 A.B.A. J. 1667 (1983).
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they seek different truths in different ways. Science seeks truth
through an analysis of physical facts and phenomena. It is based
on the material and posits that which can be done. Science is
mechanical, technical, value-free, and nonhumanistic. Science pro-
nounces the law as supplied by nature. Law seeks justice through a
philosophical inquiry. It is based on rights and duties and posits
that which may be done. Law is dialectical, idealistic, nontechnical,
value-laden and humanistic. Law, in the nonscientific sense, seeks
to free society from the rule of science.
Law is the only tool that society has to tame and channel science
and technology. Only law can simultaneously ensure the scientist's
freedom to seek scientific truth and the individual's freedom to
choose to live by his own moral, social, and religious principles.
Thus, those who enact and interpret law bear a heavy burden.
They must understand the relationship of science and law, and the
manner in which that relationship affects society, its institutions,
and its basic values.
Though science and law must coexist in this modern age of tech-
nology, their students and practitioners lack a mutual understand-
ing. As different as science and law are, however, each must be
channelled and employed to provide the maximum societal benefit.
Neither can blindly dominate without injury to the other and to
society. Neither can displace the other without destroying the dual
goal of material progress and individual freedom.
Ill. THE THREAT
With federal civil suits increasing seven times faster than our
population over the past two decades, one might assume that law
is in the ascendency. The reality, however, belies the assumption.
Experience indicates that the scientific juggernaut can turn us into
what Thoreau called "the tools of [our] tools,"3 and can threaten
to overwhelm our jurisprudence. The strength and potential
growth of the threat is debatable, but the existence of the threat is
not.
Science in court is not a new phenomenon. Science and technol-
ogy have long been present in criminal, product liability, and pat-
3. H. THOREAU, WALDEN; OR, LIE iN THE WOODS 41 (1854).
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ent cases. In cases where the law is clear and unchallenged, deci-
sions appropriately may turn on a scientific fact.4 Such cases must
be distinguished, however, from those in which the law, rather
than scientific fact, must control.5
The distinction between issues of law and issues of fact ensures
that the values of law are preserved. The distinction does not re-
quire mistreatment of science in the courtroom, although examples
of abuse of science and scientists do exist.' The adversary process
can produce abuses of science, which is anathema to those who
seek scientific truth, but that problem is different from the concern
here. The present problem involves the reach of science into sensi-
tive areas, such as fetal experimentation, personal surveillance, ge-
netics, and the elimination of risk in an industrial and technical
milieu. That reach threatens. to replace a value-based system of
law as the foundation of decisionmaking with a system based on
value-free science.
A. The Evolution of the Threat
Technological advances in our complex and crowded society
have produced sociopolitical health, safety, and environmental
problems. These problems have spawned governmental regulatory
efforts resulting in a new type of litigation which focuses on scien-
tific, rather than traditional, legal issues. Unwilling or unable to
trust one another, people have turned to government, and particu-
larly to the courts, to resolve their disputes.
Recognizing the need to protect society against new dangers
from an explosive technology, Congress has limited its role by en-
acting statutes that establish only laudable, noncontroversial
goals.7 These statutes assign to an executive or independent agency
4. For example, we often rely on the testimony of forensic scientists in deciding whether
crimes have been committed, or whether a suspect was at the crime scene.
5. For example, in reviewing the risk-versus-benefit analysis underlying an agency's deci-
sion, courts often emphasize procedural regularity, although they sense a need to under-
stand the scientific underpinnings of the agency's decision.
6. John Thornton notes that lawyers frequently abuse forensic science and forensic scien-
tists by selecting and presenting only limited scientific evidence, thus distorting it in their
efforts to win their cases. Thornton, Uses and Abuses of Forensic Science, 69 A.B.A. J. 288,
292 (1983).
7. Examples of such statutes include the Hazardous Substances Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-
1276 (1982), the Consumer Product Safety Act, id. §§ 2051-2083, the Toxic Substances Con-
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the duty to design and enforce regulations to achieve the identified
goals.8 The statutes vary widely in the decisional parameters that
they provide, and weaken the constitutional principle prohibiting
congressional delegation of legislative functions. Because the stat-
utes are ambiguous and give broad discretion to the agencies, and
because virtually anyone dissatisfied with an agency decision may
obtain judicial review of the decision,9 final regulatory policy is
often established in the courts.
Many appeals of agency decisions involve science-related, socio-
political disputes that courts are ill-equipped, unable, or unautho-
rized to resolve within the traditional judicial process. Unanswered
and unaswerable questions abound. For example, will the court's
decision be judicial, scientific, or political? Are the controlling
principles legal, scientific, or political? What will be the conse-
quences of the court's decision, not only to the parties, but to per-
sons and groups not before the court? What is the true nature and
probability of the risk? How reliable and complete are the scien-
tific data presented? Is a scientific answer being sought when none
exists? What does "safe" mean? Do animal test results apply to
humans? These and similar questions indicate a technical uncer-
tainty which, like a siren song, can attract so much attention that
consideration and application of what Professor Tribe calls our
"fragile" values is virtually impossible.10
B. Examples of the Threat
When questions arising from scientific or technical activities are
presented to the courts under the artificial regime of bipartisan ad-
trol Act, id. §§ 2601-2629, the Highway Safety Act, 23 id. §§ 401-408, and the Air Pollution
Control Act, 42 id. §§ 1857-1858 (1976).
8. For example, the Consumer Product Safety Commission is charged with enforcing the
Hazardous Substances Act and the Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1269, 2056,
2058; the Environmental Protection Agency is charged with enforcing the Toxic Substances
Control Act and the Air Pollution Control Act, id. § 2605, 42 id. §§ 1857-18571; and the
Department of Transportation is charged with enforcing the Highway Safety Act, 23 id.
8 402.
9. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982). "A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or
adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action ... is entitled to judicial review thereof."
Id. Last year, 3,500 demands for judicial review of agency decisions were filed in the United
States Courts of Appeal.
10. L. TRIBE, WHEN VALUEs CoNFLiCr 61 (1975).
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versarial litigation, value questions may seem indistinguishable
from questions of scientific fact. Failure to make the distinction,
however, would allow moral, philosophical, and political decisions
to be based solely on the outcome of a purely technical debate be-
tween scientific experts. This result has already occurred in a vari-
ety of instances.
Sheila Jasanoff and Dorothy Nelkin have identified many exam-
ples of cases in which scientific fact determined the outcome.11 In
one example, the plaintiff sued a hospital for refusing her request
for in vitro fertilization.12 The court focused almost entirely on
purely scientific considerations. It looked at the doctors' level of
expertise, whether temperature charts reliably forecasted ovulation
times, and whether test tubes or petri dishes were better fertiliza-
tion vehicles. In doing so, the court virtually ignored the ethical
issue of whether the woman's desire to have a baby by in vitro
fertilization conflicted with the hospital's contractual agreement
with the federal government not to engage in human experimenta-
tion. Jasanoff and Nelkin conclude that the court subordinated the
traditional role of the judicial process-the weighing of competing
values and interests-to resolution of purely scientific questions
about the proper steps to follow and the equipment to use in con-
ducting an in vitro fertilization procedure. 13
In another example, the Consumer Product Safety Commission
(CPSC) issued a regulation prohibiting the sale of all but the smal-
lest firecrackers because of the potential for injury.' Opponents of
the regulation focused their arguments on whether the safety re-
cord of firecrackers justified the regulation," and on whether peo-
ple have a right to use larger firecrackers in religious ceremonies. 6
11. Jasanoff & Nelkin, Science, Technology, and the Limits of Judicial Competence, 214
Sci. 1211 (1981).
12. See Powledge, A Report from the Del Zio Trial, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct. 1978, at
15.
13. See Jasanoff & Nelkin, supra note 11, at 1215.
14. 16 C.F.R. §§ 1500.17(a)(3), (8), (9) (1983).
15. Opponents argued that few injuries resulted from the use of medium or large
firecrackers, that injury occurred only to the careless, and that similar state laws had not
had the desired effect of reducing firecracker-related injuries. Proposed Curb on Explosive
Content in Firecrackers: Comments Continue the Debate, 1975-1977 CONSUMER PROD.
SArETY GumE (CCH) 1 43,044.
16. Id.
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The court initially remanded the cases to the CPSC to correct pro-
cedural errors.17 The court later approved the CPSC's amended or-
der and the regulation, stating only that the CPSC had followed
correct procedure and had adopted findings supported by substan-
tial evidence.18 Whether the federal government has the power
under the Constitution to protect a citizen from self-injury ap-
peared to play no role in the court's decision.
When the Department of Transportation decided to rescind its
regulation requiring seatbelts or airbags in all new automobiles, a
group of insurance companies sought judicial review. The United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit over-
turned the agency decision19 and the United States Supreme Court
affirmed,20 primarily because the agency had not articulated ade-
quate reasons for rescinding, rather than extending, compliance
deadlines. The decisions are replete with statistics gleaned from
surveys and studies concerning automobile accidents, injuries,
costs to medical budgets, and the percentage of people that would
voluntarily use seatbelts.21 The agency had determined that an ed-
ucational system that would allow citizens to make informed
choices whether to purchase and use protective devices would not
result in satisfactorily prompt and widespread use.22 The courts
dismissed as irrelevant both citizen fears of being trapped in an
automobile after an accident and a study indicating that as many
as forty percent of the people would refuse to wear a belt under
any circumstances.23 Neither opinion, however, discussed whether
the forced prevention of self-injury was a proper role for the gov-
ernment to assume.
The state court decisions that interpret laws requiring motorcy-
cle riders to wear approved helmets illustrate the dichotomy be-
17. National Soc'y for the Prevention of Blindness v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n,
1975-1977 CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY GumE (CCH) 75,146 (D.C. Cir. June 23, 1977).
18. National Soc'y for the Prevention of Blindness v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n,
No. 76-1495, slip op. (D.C. Cir. Oct. 5, 1977).
19. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Department of Transp., 680 F.2d 206 (D.C. Cir.
1982), aff'd sub nom. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 103 S.
Ct. 2856 (1983).
20. 103 S. Ct. 2856 (1983).
21. See, e.g., 103 S. Ct. at 2861-72; 680 F.2d at 213-18.
22. 103 S. Ct. at 2872; 680 F.2d at 217-18.
23. 103 S. Ct. at 2872 n.18, 2873; 680 F.2d at 215 n.12, 217.
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tween a basic value and the public interest. The vast majority of
these decisions uphold the statutes as proper exercises of the po-
lice power.24 The decisions are premised on statistics comparing
head injuries received by those wearing helmets with the injuries
received by those not wearing helmets,2" and on the additional
state costs for medical services that could accrue because injuries
were received by someone not wearing a helmet.26
Defendants argue unsuccessfully that helmets themselves could
cause injuries and accidents. One court reasoned that an un-
helmeted motorcyclist might cause harm to others, 7 such as the
injury to others involved in an accident caused by the motorcy-
clist,28 or the potential suffering of a spouse and children if a mo-
torcyclist were injured or killed. Such efforts to show a risk of in-
jury to others because a motorcylist refuses to wear a helmet
appear more frequently when the court is faced with a vigorous
dissent addressing the fundamental question whether the state has
the right to punish citizens because they choose to risk self-
injury.29
The helmet-law cases demonstrate that, although many courts
do not consider underlying values when making decisions, others
24. See State v. Lee, 51 Hawaii 516, 465 P.2d 573 (1970); Everhardt v. New Orleans, 253
La. 285, 217 So. 2d 400 (1968); Commonwealth v. Howie, 354 Mass. 769, 238 N.E.2d 373,
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 999 (1968); State v. Anderson, 275 N.C. 168, 166 S.E.2d 49 (1969);
State v. Odegaard, 165 N.W.2d 677 (N.D. 1969); State v. Fetterly, 254 Or. 47, 456 P.2d 996
(1969); State v. Lombardi, 104 R.I. 28, 241 A.2d 625 (1968); Ex parte Smith, 441 S.W.2d 544
(Tex. 1969); State v. Laitinen, 77 Wash. 2d 130, 459 P.2d 789 (1969); Bisenius v. Karns, 42
Wis. 2d 42, 165 N.W.2d 377 (1969). But see People v. Fries, 42 IML 2d 446, 250 N.E.2d 149
(1969); American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Davids, 11 Mich. App. 351, 158 N.W.2d 72 (1969).
25. See Lee, 51 Hawaii at 520, 465 P.2d at 576; Everhardt, 253 La. at 294, 217 So. 2d at
403; Anderson, 275 N.C. at 174, 166 S.E.2d at 53; Fetterly, 254 Or. at 48-51, 456 P.2d at
996-97; Lombardi, 104 R.I. at 30-31, 241 A.2d at 627; Laitinen, 77 Wash. 2d at 133-34, 459
P.2d at 791; Bisenius, 42 Wis. 2d at 50, 165 N.W.2d at 381.
26. See Odegaard, 165 N.W.2d at 679; Laitinen, 77 Wash. 2d at 134, 459 N.W.2d at 791-
92.
27. See Fetterley, 254 Or. at 49, 456 P.2d at 996.
28. See id.
29. See, e.g., Lee, 51 Hawaii at 524-28, 465 P.2d at 578-80 (Abe, J., dissenting); Laitinen,
77 Wash. 2d at 135, 459 P.2d at 792 (Hill, J., dissenting). These dissents cite examples of
everyday activities that states could prohibit if they have the right to protect citizens from
the risks of self-injury, such as crossing the street, smoking, eating an improper diet, walk-




do consider those values. One may quarrel with the philosophical
balance struck between individual freedom and the state in any
one case. The balance, however, must be struck. If a striking of the
balance in courts and legislatures eventually results in a displace-
ment of jurisprudence by juriscience, no one could then say that
society had not exercised its right to choose between the two.
Thus, many regulatory decisions can be viewed as raising certain
fundamental questions. Is the regulation premised on some under-
lying concept that the government effectively owns the citizen and
therefore may prevent the citizen from risking self-injury?30 Does a
law that prohibits citizens from injuring themselves accord with
the concept of individual liberty expressed in the Declaration of
Independence and the Constitution? What is the legal rationale, as
distinguished from the technical facts, that justifies the regulation?
Are ordinary citizens too careless or recalcitrant to know and do
what is good for them? Will informing the citizen of the risk asso-
ciated with his behavior achieve the same result as the regulation?
If we regulate because the injured citizen might require publicly
supported medical treatment, thereby increasing the cost of gov-
ernmental medical programs, should we not prohibit every activity
that might cause an increase in the likelihood of added costs to the
government's medical budget, or require citizens to undertake pre-
ventive measures so they will not add to the public burden?31
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, to what extent and under
what circumstances should courts consider, or even raise sua
sponte, such questions?
Asking these questions does not mean that one favors unre-
strained freedom. The citizens of 1984 cannot live as the free-rang-
ing cowboy lived in 1884. Indeed, most people recognize that many
activities, such as drug addiction, promote criminal activity and
therefore should be prohibited. Asking these questions, however,
emphasizes the proposition that a major function of the law is to
balance the citizen's freedom to do anything that does not injure
another citizen-the swing of one's fist short of a neighbor's
30. The government does own some citizens, in at least one sense. The government may,
and indeed must, require soldiers to avoid many risks of self-injury so that they will be
combat-ready.
31. For example, should we prohibit the use of tobacco, alcohol, coffee, and "junk food,"
and require people to exercise, maintain a proper diet, and get plenty of sleep?
1984]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
nose-against the interests of society and the state.
This Article does not suggest the appropriate answers to the
above and similar questions. Its intent is not to quarrel with the
outcome of any particular case. The intent is to caution that an-
swering the fundamental questions raised requires full presenta-
tion, argument, and study. If the Orwellian social order, in which
everything in life is either ordered or forbidden, is to prevail, it
should be consciously chosen. It should not arrive as a result of
courts making society's decisions solely on the basis of scientific
fact.
IV. RESPONSES
The problems raised here are not insurmountable. With some
trepidation, this Article will make some limited suggestions. How-
ever society may respond, it should first evaluate the suggestions
based upon the intended results, and then on the likelihood of
achieving those results.
A. Restructuring the Courts
Many commentators have suggested improving the scientific
competence of judges, embellishing court staffs with social scien-
tists and technicians, and providing the judicial system with better
technical input.3 2 The primary difficulty with suggestions for re-
structuring court staffs and for retraining judges to improve their
scientific competence lies in the assumption upon which the sug-
gestions are based. The suggestions are predicated on the assump-
tion that courts will decide increasing numbers of sociopolitical
cases on a mixture of scientific and political grounds. Thus, the
restructuring suggestions are designed to improve judicial compe-
tence in areas in which many believe the courts should not be in-
volved at all. Transforming judges into scientists and technologists,
and surrounding judges with scientists and technologists untrained
in law, is unnecessary and unwise. Judges need only learn about
science, scientists, and their empiric methodology, and the distinc-
tion between science and law. Furthermore, unnecessary changes
could put the supremacy of law at risk.
32. See supra note 2.
[Vol. 25:525534
JURISPRUDENCE OR "JURISCIENCE1?
Courts will continue to deal, as they always have, with technical
evidence. The retraining and restructuring suggestions arise be-
cause technology is complex, the judicial workload is enormous,
and cases in which courts must evaluate risk and benefits demand
that judges determine whether technological predictions alone can
justify enjoining otherwise legal action. Pointing to judicial deci-
sions based on scientific data they consider inadequate, those mak-
ing the suggestions appear to accept the premise that judges
should decide scientific truth. Opponents of these suggestions
would maintain that a court should look first to the law to find the
relevant underlying values, and then should determine the manner
in which the technical facts are affected by those values.
Suggestions for increasing the technological competence of
courts so that they can decide cases on scientific evidence alone
suffer from the same basic flaw as suggestions that courts should
determine only whether a regulatory agency followed correct pro-
cedural and evidentiary rules.' 3 The flaw in both suggestions is the
absence of a specific requirement that traditional jurisprudential
values assume primary importance in the decisional hierarchy. Ex-
perience indicates that the ordering of priorities must be conscious
and expressed; it cannot be assumed.
That judges should not be retrained or courts restructured does
not mean that the judicial review process is functioning perfectly.
Some judicial soul-searching and self-improvement is appropriate.
If judicial review is to serve its intended role in administrative law
cases, for example, courts must not lose sight of their role. Both
judicial independence and judicial process are diminished when
courts undertake the social policymaking duties of legislatures.
The desire to increase judicial competence in highly technical
matters arises in part from the belief that courts frustrate the goals
of the complaining groups. Environmentalists view courts as sub-
servient to industry; industry views courts as impediments to pro-
gress. Such a result is not unexpected because consistent applica-
tion of the law to varying fact patterns invariably produces varying
33. The suggestions that a court should evaluate an agency decision only on the basis of
procedural and evidentiary rules would ensure due process rights, but would also give the
court's imprimatur to an agency decision that may have rested' solely on scientific evidence
and ignored our jurisprudential values.
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results. Nonetheless, the embroilment of the courts in the essen-
tially political contest between groups asserting conflicting views of
the public interest, and the overlap of scientific and policy ques-
tions in many cases, blur the proper function of unelected federal
judges in a representative democracy. The courts cannot maintain
effectiveness if they attempt to enunciate solutions for all of soci-
ety's problems.
B. Judicial Review of Agency Action
Judicial review of administrative agency action is inconsistent.
Conscientious, dedicated judges struggle daily with various statu-
tory and judicial standards of review. The distinctions among such
standards as clearly erroneous, arbitrary and capricious, prepon-
derance of the evidence, no substitution of judgment, rational ba-
sis, clear error of judgment, clearly unreasonable, and abuse of dis-
cretion are not always clear. Moreover, the scope of review applied
by a court in any particular case is often uncertain. The apparent
lack of consistency among decisions of different courts and even
among those of different panels of the same court is not surprising.
Efforts to achieve symmetry by assigning different standards of
review to legal and factual questions founder because the terms,
"law" and "fact," lack clearly agreed upon definitions. Whether the
question before a court is one of law or fact is up to the court
alone. Thus, labeling a question as one of law can be a handy de-
vice to free a court from deferring to an agency's findings of fact.
The mixed-question concept also enables the court to substitute its
own policy for that of the agency while announcing, and perhaps
believing, that it is not doing so. Unfortunately, busy judges, fight-
ing the flood of litigation, may not notice the risk to the legitimacy
of judicial review that can result from linguistic subterfuges. Con-
versely, complete deference to a challenged agency action because
a question of fact is .involved also can do substantial injustice. In-
deed, limiting the court's review to consideration of the scientific
fact determinations of an agency can be a ready means for con-
verting jurisprudence into juriscience.
Concentrated efforts to divine a uniform yardstick for distin-
guishing questions of law from questions of fact would highlight
the need for courts to consider the law first. Although the Admin-
istrative Conference of the United States has studied the matter,
[Vol. 25:525
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little has been done to create a method of review that would be
applicable to agency actions based on technical fact predictions
and evaluations of risk versus benefit. If the courts are to remain
guarantors of the individual freedoms envisaged in the Bill of
Rights, the courts must continue to exercise their one function: the
administration of justice. The courts can administer justice only if
they maintain the respect of the people, the lifeblood of the judi-
cial process. The courts can lose that respect by failing to empha-
size and uphold our system's fundamental values.
C. Congressional Review
The Administrative Procedure Act 4 and every statute that es-
tablishes and assigns duties to an agency must be reviewed and
revised. Review and revision is a monumental task, but no other
project would aid our society more in its attempt to retain the rule
of law amidst a burdgeoning growth of population and technology.
Only Congress can bring order out of the chaos it has created. Con-
gress in some instances has required the impossible by mandating
almost complete elimination of risk. In other instances, Congress
has prohibited the acceptance of inconsequential risks without
considering the costs of eliminating the risk and the loss of other
benefits. Often Congress has created an agency while ignoring the
possible effects of the agency's mandated activities on the activities
of other agencies, groups, and institutions. Statutes vary widely in
expressing the scope of an agency's authority, the standards that
govern agency action, and the standards of judicial review.
To protect its own interests, Congress should review and revise
these laws. Congress should not be a mere way station on a prob-
lem's route to the courts. That situation has arisen partly because
of confusion in the statutes, and partly because the public per-
ceives that Congress has abdicated its role and that definitive deci-
sions are available only from the courts.
A complete congressional review of the entire regulatory land-
scape may be too much to expect. If done, however, it could make
a major contribution toward assuring the people that their system
of jurisprudence will not be surreptitiously converted into a system
34. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-559 (1982).
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of juriscience.
D. Revision of Science and Pre-law Curricula
One critical impediment to maintaining a proper balance be-
tween science and law is the superspecialization rampant among
scientists and lawyers. The barrier between science and law is
maintained because each profession has its own jargon, each must
remain abreast of its own specialization, and each tends to concen-
trate its time and draw its friends from that which provides its
members with a living. Chances are slight that the gulf between
scientists and lawyers can be bridged.
Superspecialization has had a detrimental effect on our decision-
making process. Our national security, economy, environment, ju-
dicial process, and much of what happens in our daily lives depend
on this process. In business, legislatures, schools, government agen-
cies, and on the bench, decisions made within a narrow frame of
reference by philosophically illiterate technologists and technologi-
cally illiterate lawyers lead to inconsistency and confusion in the
affected institutions.
The answer lies with future generations and the type of prepara-
tory education available to them. An interdisciplinary approach is
needed in which those planning a career in law would learn about
science and scientists, and in which science students would learn
about law and lawyers. The National Conference of Lawyers and
Scientists recently launched an effort to encourage such cross-
training." This idea needs and deserves academic support because
the best hope for handling the interaction of science and law is the
creation of a new generation of scientists and lawyers who under-
stand and respect each other's role. That generation would have a
better chance of maintaining a proper balance between material
progress and individual freedom.
E. Regulatory Reform
Simon Ramo, former chairman of the President's Committee on
35. Thomas, A Report frbm the Workshop on Cross-Education of Lawyers and Scien-
tists, 19 Juam~mucs J. 92 (1978). The National Conference of Lawyers and Scientists is a




Science and Technology, has suggested a comprehensive scheme of
regulatory reform.36 Ramo's approach separates the two functions
of government in regulating technology: investigation and decision-
making.3 7 An investigative organization would be established, mod-
elled after the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 8 It would be
staffed with scientists and technologists equipped and funded to
investigate any field of technology.39 This organization would make
no decisions at the end of an investigation, but would instead pre-
sent its evidence and recommendations to the second organization,
the decisionmaking body."0
The decisiomnaking organization would be comprised of a num-
ber of boards that would process cases. 41 The boards would hold
hearings and compare alternatives, balance the risks, costs, and
benefits, and consider the case in light of other national interests.
Finally, the board would decide whether to ban, limit, modify, or
approve the challenged technological operation.42 Ramo recognizes
that some people will nonetheless seek judicial review, but he also
recognizes that careful drafting of the legislation establishing the
new organizations would diminish the number and nature of such
demands.' 3 The courts should retain only their traditional role of
ensuring that government agencies act within the law." The Ramo
approach or similar suggestions deserve careful consideration.
V. RULES OF TECHNOLOGICAL ADJUDICATION
The tension between science and law must be mitigated. Trepi-
dation aside, one should not merely identify a problem without of-
fering some solution. This Article's response to the problem of pre-
serving the supremacy of the law and its values when science
enters the courtroom assumes that the tension will continue to in-
36. See Ramo, Regulation of Technological Activities: A New Approach, 213 SCL 837
(1981).
37. See id. at 841.
38. Id. at 842.
39. Id. at 841-42.
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crease. The courts are not likely to be restructured, and Congress
is not likely to rewrite statutes that give rise to the tension.
Academe is notoriously slow to change, and the Ramo recommen-
dation has yet to receive enthusiastic support. Hence this Article's
response is limited to action that can be taken by the group
charged with the administration of justice, the courts.
The conduct of the judicial process, of course, is governed by
many rules. These include rules of civil procedure, rules of appel-
late procedure, rules of evidence, rules of criminal procedure,
bankruptcy rules, and local rules of court.4 5 No rules, however, spe-
cifically facilitate judicial handling of technological issues while
preserving the supremacy of legal and ethical values. Formulation
of such a set of rules is fraught with difficulty. The many features
of the adversarial process must be preserved. One must consider,
moreover, whether a rule would impinge on established require-
ments for laying a foundation, or whether it would revise the bur-
den of production or proof. The rules, therefore, should be created
by a committee of judges, lawyers, scientists, and regulators. Thus,
the final form of the rules would probably be quite different from
any proposed at the outset of a rule-drafting process.
Presented here is a draft of Rules of Technological Adjudication.
These are a mere beginning, but they might serve as a starting
point for further discussion.
Rule I. Judges Shall Be Receptive to Technology.
Judges should create-if necessary, force-a personal wel-
come for technology. This should not be merely an acceptance
or toleration, but an active, eager, receptive, and interested
welcome. Judges should not be intimidated or scornful be-
cause they fear the unknown. The supremacy of the law can
only be aided, not injured, if judges welcome technology in its
proper role.
Rule II. Lawyers Shall Educate Judges on the Technology in
the Case.
Judges should say, "I don't know." Judicial inadequacies
45. The MANUAL FOR CoMPLEX LMGATION (CCH) (1978) provides some assistance to
judges and lawyers trying to sort out these rules.
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should not be shielded. Lawyers should not assume or pretend
that the judge knows.
Rule III. A Technological Glossary Shall Be Supplied to the
Court.
The glossary should contain every technological term that
will be used in the case with an easily understood definition
for each.
Rule IV. The Parties Shall Not Present Unanswerable Sci-
entific Questions for Decisions.
The parties should stipulate which scientific questions can
be answered. Judges should not be frustrated because they are
unable to find an answer when no answer exists.
Rule V. The Court Shall Not Attempt to Decide "Scientific
Truth."
The court should initially confine itself to determining
whether the law and justice require or permit a change in the
status quo. If a change is required or permitted, then the
court should decide whether the agency followed correct
procedures.
Rule VI. Experts Shall Not Testify "Past" Each Other.
Expert testimony should be structured so that the experts
meet on the same ground. Testimony of opposing experts
should be alternated when necessary to achieve the intent of
this rule.
Rule VII. The Court Shall Be Entitled to the Best Available
Expert Testimony.
Courts should control adversary concepts and impugning of
witnesses to overcome the distaste for the adversarial process
that keeps outstanding scientific experts from consenting to
testifying in court.
Rule VIII. Counsel Shall Disclose Contrary Expert Evidence.
Exercising the same candor and integrity that requires law-
yers to disclose contrary precedent, counsel who are aware of
expert evidence contrary to their position should disclose it to
1984]
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the court.
Rule IX. Simple and Complex Technical Fact Issues Shall
Be Separated.
Counsel should separate simple and complex technical fact
issues before trial, and should delineate the issues for the
court.
Rule X. Summaries of Expert Testimony Shall Be Stated in
Plain Language.
The summaries, in plain language to the maximum extent
possible, should be submitted to the court before trial.
Rule XI. No Ex Parte Tests May Be Introduced.
Neither the results of ex parte tests nor testimony about
the tests may be introduced, unless opposing counsel declined
an invitation to observe the tests.
Rule XH. The Court May Order Technological Experiments
During Trial.
When the court decides that a conflict between experts on a
material question may be resolved by an experiment, the
court may, in its discretion, order an appropriate courtroom
experiment.
Rule XIII. Only the Technology Necessary for a Decision
Shall Be Presented.
Judges and juries need not become experts in a field to de-
cide a case involving evidence from that field. They may, how-
ever, be expected to understand enough about the field to
render a reasoned decision.
Rule XIV. Technological Issues Shall Be Simplified.
The technology should be broken into segments and analo-
gized to readily understood phenomena and experience.
Rule XV. Technical Jargon Shall Not Be Used in Court.
To the maximum extent possible, technical jargon should




The goal of law is justice as well as truth. Justice is not easily
defined, but like obscenity, we know it when we see it. Moreover,
we can recognize injustice even more easily when we see it.
The problem of preserving justice in a technological age is
neither primarily legal nor primarily scientific. The problem lies in
the field of ethical, moral, and religious values. The problem can be
solved, or at least controlled, if we understand the nature of man-
kind and the purpose of government.
Attempts to remake the judicial process into a scientific tool,
whether to solve a broad social problem, to achieve a socio-scien-
tific goal, to promote a societal goal, or to compensate or adjust the
status of whole classes of people, can distort and destroy the judi-
cial process. Of equal importance, the public respect necessary to
sustain courts as independent guarantors of human and civil rights
may be lost if the judicial process becomes scientized.
The decisional process that a scientist employs in analyzing the
costs and benefits of building a dam or a nuclear power plant is
entirely distinct from the decisional process that a court employs
in determining legal liability, assessing damages, or determining
guilt or innocence. One problem stemming from judicial efforts to
force risk-versus-benefit cases into the traditional judicial process
is the tendency to allow science to overshadow the law's traditional
values. The judicial process is designed to deal with events and
conduct. The risk-versus-benefit cases involve broad policy ques-
tions that define the future direction of large segments of society.
The answers are not found in the Constitution, but in policy
choices that legislatures should make. If such cases are to continue
to be decided by courts, care must be exercised to ensure that the
judicial process remains judicial.
A set of Rules of Technological Adjudication might assist judges
in integrating technology into the framework of transcendent legal
values. Rules that help courts determine technological facts and
their proper role in the decisionmaking process can forestall, if not
foreclose, the possibility that juriscience will replace jurisprudence.
Those blessed with the privilege of working at the heartbeat of a
free society carry a special responsibility. In this technological age,
that responsibility includes a duty to keep inviolate the values that
only law can protect.
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